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Abstract 
The presented article deals with labour market institutions and labour market flexibility in 
the Visegrád countries. We can find out in theoretical literature a traditional set of institutional 
aspects such as employment protection legislation, structure of wage bargaining, taxation of 
labour, active labour market policies, the system of unemployment and social benefits. All 
these aspects determine the institutional framework of the labour market. Theoretical 
literature also has defined labour market flexibility as an instrument for adjustment process in 
case of asymmetric shock. The article is composed of the comparative analysis of selected 
criteria and corresponding economic indicators of the EU member states (EU-15 and V-4). 
The evidence shows that the values of labour market flexibility in the Visegrád group 
countries were higher than average of old EU-15 member states.  
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Introduction 
The presented paper deals with the various problems associated with labour market 
performance in the Czech Republic and other Visegrád group countries (V-4). The main goal 
of the article is to evaluate an institutional framework of V-4 labour markets within EU and in 
the context of future adopting single currency. Labour markets in EU new member states are 
blamed for insufficient flexibility which has stemmed from persisting but still weakening 
influence of precedent system of central planned economy. This argumentation has been 
supported by the development of main macroeconomic indicators such as high unemployment 
rate, respectively low employment rate and high share of long term unemployment on overall 
unemployment. Moreover, after joining the Eurozone new member state will lose autonomous 
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monetary policy which is perceived as effective instrument of economic policy in case of an 
asymmetric shock. Then we can ask if any alternative instrument exists. Economic theory 
defined fiscal policy as one of the main instruments but because of Maastricht ´s fiscal criteria 
and long-term state-budget deficits in most V-4 countries this instrument will hardly to be 
used. Then the only possible instrument is labour market flexibility.  
 
1. Conception of labour market flexibility 
In this part of the paper I focus on institutional framework of the labour market or more 
precisely I try to outline main theoretical approaches to individual institutional aspects.  
The labour market is more complicated in general way. In accordance with [3] the labour 
market is affected by culture, institutional, legislative or political mechanism. Generally, we 
can find this structure of labour market institutions in theoretical literature:1 employment 
protection legislation, structure of wage bargaining, active labour market policies, taxation of 
labour and unemployment benefits. 
 Most studies are focusing on influence of institutional aspects on unemployment or 
employment, both in positive or negative direction - (i) some institutional aspects may 
generate higher unemployment rate; (ii) some institutional aspects may influence the nature of 
unemployment but have an ambiguous effects on unemployment rate and (iii) some 
institutional aspects do not influence both the nature of unemployment or unemployment rate.  
The analysis of an influence of these aspects may be carried out in two directions: first, we 
can analyse the degree of labour market regulation, secondly, we can try to find an optimal 
setting of institutional framework.  
Freeman [13] discriminates two approaches to labour market regulation. The first one 
(institutionalist view) considers these aspects desirable as significant instrument of social 
protection and they can incite growth of productivity. These aspects can also operate as 
moderate measures in case of aggregate demand decline. The second one (distortionist view) 
highlights the benefit of market mechanism and takes it, that these institutional aspects 
impede the adjustment process in case of economic shocks.   
Betcherman et al [3], on the basis of World Development Report, Workers in an 
Integrating World, the World Bank (1995), emphasizes four different reasons for public 
intervention in the labour market: 
1. Uneven market power - workers may find themselves in a weak bargaining position.  
                                                 
1
 Borghijs and van Poeck [5]; Buscher et al [7]; Jackman, Layard and Nickell [16]. 
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2. Discrimination - workers belonging to groups with little voice or power (e.g., due to age, 
gender, ethnicity, etc.) may experience particular disadvantages in the labour market.  
3. Insufficient information - workers and some employers may not have adequate 
information to make informed decisions about the conditions of work.  
4. Inadequate insurance against risk - workers are typically unable to formally insure 
themselves against labour market-related risks associated, for example, with 
unemployment, disability, or old age. 
Blanchard and Wolfers [4] pursued how labour market institutions form the impact of 
shocks on unemployment in two directions. First, they examined aspects influence on the 
impact of shocks on unemployment. Secondly, the authors examined their influence on the 
persistence of unemployment. In context of European labour market the authors conclude: 
„There is enough heterogeneity in labor market institutions within Europe to potentially 
explain differences in unemployment rates today. As to the evolution of  institutions over time, 
it is clear that neither the view that labor market institutions have been stable through time, 
nor the view that the labor market rigidities are a recent development are right.“ 2 
If labour market flexibility may be an instrument of adjustment process in case of an 
asymmetric shock I matter to define labour market flexibility and its aspects. We can find out 
pregnant definition of labour market flexibility in Eamets and Masso [11]: “We can say that 
labour market flexibility shows how quickly markets adjust to the external shocks and 
changing macroeconomic conditions.” 3 
Klau and Mittelstadt [17] distinguish four broad aspects of labour market flexibility: (i) 
real labour cost flexibility at the economy-wide level; (ii) adaptability of relative labour costs 
across occupations and enterprises; (iii) labour mobility and (iv) flexibility of working time 
and work schedules. The first two are macro- and microeconomic aspects of labour-cost 
flexibility, while the latter two relate to the quantitative and qualitative adaptability of the 
supply and use of labour. Some of these elements interact. Eamets and Masso [11] also 
subdivide flexibility into microeconomic and macroeconomic level. Macroeconomic level can 
be further divided into institutional flexibility and wage flexibility. The first one represents to 
what degree the institutions and labour unions are involved in regulation of labour market. 
The latter one indicates how the wages are sensitive to market fluctuations. Microeconomic 
flexibility is associated with the labour market flows analysis. The labour market can be 
characterized by various flows of workers (transitions between labour market states, 
                                                 
2
 Blanchard  and Wolfers [4, p.16] 
3
 Eamets and Masso [11, p.4] 
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occupational mobility and geographical mobility) and by jobs flows (job creation and job 
destruction). 
 
2. Employment protection legislation 
First observed institutional aspect is employment protection legislation (EPL). We can 
understand EPL as rules refer to hiring and firing process (e.g. unfair dismissals, termination 
of employment for economic reasons, severance payments, minimum notice periods, 
administrative authorization for dismissals, and prior consultations with trade union and/or 
labour administration representatives).  
Betcherman et al [3] considers EPL along a rigidity/flexibility continuum. At the rigid end 
these regulations are enforced: temporary employment is restricted, hiring standards for 
employers are in force, employer´s decision on workers dismissal is limited by legislation or 
by severance, notice, and administrative requirements. At the flexible end liberal concept of 
EPL is enforced: statutory (or collectively bargained) regulations are minimal and market 
mechanisms largely determine hiring and firing. 
According to Eamets and Masso [11] some of these rules of law were adopted as a 
“pillow” in case of labour demand decline which can have negative effects on employment 
while others are designed to protect employees from arbitrary dismissals. 
We can find out two parallel view of EPL. The first one supposes that strict EPL can 
impede effective labour market performance and implicitly the economy. The latter one is 
based on an opinion that employment will be more stabile and individual contracts long-term 
if strict EPL exists. In other words – strict EPL reduces hiring and firing and stabilize the 
flows within labour market. 
We can determine the level of strictness of labour market legislation through the use of 
indexes, which were created by World Bank within the frame of Doing Business Program. 
OECD Strictness of Employment Protection Legislation is an alternative option. I used in this 
article World Bank approach. 
Single axes of the hexagon are following: axis a represents Difficulty of Hiring Index and 
it means difficulty of hiring a new worker; axis b represents Rigidity of Hours Index and it 
means restrictions on expanding or contracting the number of working hours; axis c 
represents Difficulty of Firing Index and it means difficulty and expense of dismissing a 
redundant worker; axis d represents Rigidity of Employment Index and it means an average 
of the three indices; axis e represents Nonwage labour costs, which are expressed as a 
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percentage of the worker’s salary; axis f represents Firing costs (cost of a redundant worker, 
expressed in weeks of wages).4 
Figure 1. Hexagon of labour market legislation (2005) 
a
b
c
d
e
f
V4 EU-15
 
Source: Doing Business: http://www.doingbusiness.org 
Figure 1 compares the valuables of three groups – EU15 and V-4. My conclusions in this 
section are as follows: 
- V-4 countries had lower legislation regulation than EU-15 average; 
- EU-15 average employment protection legislation was the higher but considerable 
differences existed (countries with low level of regulation e.g. Denmark or United 
Kingdom on the one hand and countries with significant higher degree of regulation e.g. 
Greece or Spain).  
 
3. Structure of wage bargaining 
We understand trade union as: „a continuous association of wage earners for the purpose 
of improving the conditions of their employment”. 5 
Trade unions are established on the basic of asymmetry in contracting between individual 
workers and employers. This inconsonance rises from existence of human and labour rights. 
Aidt and Tzannatos [1] show both costs arising from existence trade unions and potential 
benefits. Trade unions play key role in wage bargaining within EU and they have impacts on 
labour costs. Higher negotiating power of trade unions tends to increase wage level above 
equilibrium level. Buscher et al [7] argues that this effect could be forced if strict EPL and 
generous unemployment benefits exist.  
                                                 
4
 Methodology is available on http://www.doingbusiness.org/MethodologySurveys/EmployingWorkers.aspx 
5
 In Checchi and Lucifera [8, p.5]  
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Borghijs and van Poeck [5] distinguish three levels of wage negotiations: (i) firm or plant 
level (decentralised bargaining); (ii) industry level (bargaining at the intermediate level) and 
(iii) national or country wide level (centralised bargaing).  
De Grauwe [14] argues: „...countries with either strong centralization or strong 
decentralization of wage bargaining are better equipped to face supply shocks, such as oil 
increase, than countries with an intermediate degree of centralization. In these „extreme“ 
countries there will be a greater wage moderation than in the intermediate countries. As a 
result, the countries with the extreme centralization or decentralization tend to fare better, in 
terms of inflation and unemployment, following supply shocks, than the others.“ 6 
This institutional aspect is hard to search because of data´s accessability and their 
harmonisation from different sources. I made use of [19] and [20]. I added one new partial 
indicator – coefficient of coverage/density. Following table summarizes main indicators for 
appraisal of the structure of wage bargaining.  
 
Table 1. Wage bargaining in selected EU countries 
  
Centralization1 
1995 – 2000 
Co-
ordination2 
1995 - 2000 
Trade Union 
Density 
2000 
Collective bargaining 
coverage (as % ) - 2000 
Coefficient 
coverage/density 
2000 
Belgium 3 4,5 56 90 1,6 
Denmark 2 4 74 80 1,08 
Finland 5 5 76 90 1,18 
France 2 2 10 90 9 
Ireland 4 4 38 n.a. - 
Italy 2 4 35 80 2,28 
Germany 3 4 25 68 2,72 
Netherlands 3 4 23 80 3,43 
Portugal 4 4 24 80 3,33 
Austria 3 4 37 95 2,56 
Spain 3 3 15 80 5,33 
Sweden 3 3 79 90 1,13 
United 
Kingdom 1 1 31 30 0,96 
Czech Republic 1 1 27 25 0,92 
Hungary 1 1 20 30 1,5 
Poland 1 1 15 40 2,67 
Slovakia 2 2 36 50 1,39 
Note: 
a) Centralisation: 
1 = Company and plant level predominant. 
2 = Combination of industry and company/plant level, with an important share of employees covered by 
company bargains. 
3 = Industry-level predominant. 
4 = Predominantly industrial bargaining, but also recurrent central-level agreements. 
5 = Central-level agreements of overriding importance. 
b) Co-ordination: 
1 = Fragmented company/plant bargaining, little or no co-ordination by upper-level associations. 
                                                 
6
 De Grauwe [14, p.16] 
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2 = Fragmented industry and company-level bargaining, with little or no pattern-setting. 
3 = Industry-level bargaining with irregular pattern-setting and moderate co-ordination among major 
bargaining 
actors. 
4 = a) informal co-ordination of industry and firm-level bargaining by (multiple) peak associations; 
b) co-ordinated bargaining by peak confederations, including government-sponsored negotiations (tripartite 
agreements, social pacts), or government imposition of wage schedules; 
c) regular pattern-setting coupled with high union concentration and/or bargaining co-ordination by large 
firms. 
d) government wage arbitration. 
5 = a) informal co-ordination of industry-level bargaining by an encompassing union confederation; 
b) co-ordinated bargaining by peak confederations or government imposition of a wage schedule/freeze, with 
a peace obligation. 
Source: OECD [19]; [20]; own calculation 
 
Trade unions ´s negotiating power is a factor which has impacts on rigidity degree of the 
labour market. This is a result of a fact that unions control wage bargaining effectively not but 
that they have few members as we can see in a table. Last but one column represents 
collective bargaining coverage (as percentage). The significant contrast was the situation in 
France, where only 10 % of workers were members of trade unions but 90 % of workers were 
covered by collective agreements. The coverage was high also in Scandinavian countries but 
this was with one difference – these countries were distinguished by high degree of union 
density which compensated the high coverage. On the other hand both indicators were low in 
some countries – Anglo-Saxon countries and V-4 countries, where both density and coverage 
reached low valuables. If we attach these indicators in a fraction (numerator is the coverage 
and denomination is a density) we get new coefficient (in table this is the last column).  
I believe that this coefficient is important factor of overall labour market flexibility. If the 
coefficient reaches value close to one, then the negotiating power of unions conforms to size 
of union´s membership. If we look at previous table we can see that United Kingdom, Czech 
Republic, Slovakia or Scandinavian were close to this value. I have tried to demonstrate that 
low unions ´s density does not mean their low negotiating power by definition. 
 
4. Labour taxation 
Taxis on employment refer to both sides on labour market – labour supply (labour force 
pay income taxes) on the one hand and labour demand (employers, who pay payroll taxes) on 
the other side.  
Economists have created so-called tax wedge which expresses overall taxation of labour 
(see figure 2). 
Figure 2. Tax wedge 
 
Tax wedge= Income tax + social security contributions (total) + payroll tax   
Gross wage + employer ´s social security contributions + payroll tax 
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Source: Dolenc and Vodopivec [10] 
Buscher et al. [7] argues that labour taxation widen the wedge between employer´s costs 
and employee´s income. If taxis are transferred on employers then employment costs rise and 
eventuality is that labour demand will fall. If firms compensate this additional costs by lower 
wages than the wage/price of product ration will not change. Indeed, the consumption 
wage/price of product ratio declines. Then more households can obtain social benefits and 
their incentive to work is reduced. Hence, rising labour taxes have a negative impact on 
employment. Daveri and Tabellini [9] controvert this argumentation on the basis of 
Scandinavian countries – they ask why unemployment is so low while high labour taxation in 
continental Europe evokes high unemployment. One possibility how to make clear this 
contrast is connectedness of high degree of centralisation and co-ordination, which can reduce 
wage claims.  
According to [2] tax wedge means that real take-home pay is lower than pre-tax real wage. 
If that tax wedge increases, than implicitly consumption grows more slowly. Authors make 
reference to tax wedge changes may affect not only the bargaining stance of unions but also 
individual labour – supply decisions. This holds if generous unemployment benefits exist.  
Table 2 represents total tax wedge and its components. The tax wedge is expressed through 
the use of percentage rate of overall labour costs. The individual components of tax wedge 
differed significantly – V-4 countries had the lowest income taxes (except Hungary) and its 
percentage rate was almost half in comparison with EU-15 average (14,2 %). Scandinavian 
countries (Denmark, Finland and Sweden) and Germany or Belgium had the highest income 
taxes. We can see significant differences in the percentage rates of social security contribution 
too - workers in Poland, Netherlands, Austria or Germany paid the highest amounts while 
workers in Ireland, Spain, Finland or Sweden paid the lowest amounts. If we look at 
employer´s social security contribution rates, employees in France, Hungary, Czech Republic, 
Sweden, Italy, Spain and Germany had the highest rates in EU. The lowest rates existed in 
Anglo-Saxon countries: USA, United Kingdom and Ireland. 
We can find some comparative advantage in the last column. This column represents 
labour costs in US dollars with equal purchasing power. The tendency is that labour costs in 
new member states convergence to EU average. So it is evident that this comparative 
advantage will not last forever. We have to look at other indicators to determine long-term 
criteria of competitive strength on the basic of the future outlook. This alternative indicator 
could be the total tax wedge. If we look at this indicator we can see that comparative 
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advantage will disappear. V-4 countries (except Slovakia) had higher total tax wedge in 
comparison with EU average. I argue that foreigner investors can make decision on the basic 
of the total tax wedge (because total labour costs converge in long-term period in EU) which 
it may subsequently end in that they can prefer countries with lower rate of the total tax 
wedge.  
Table 2. Labour taxation (as % of labour costs, 2005)1 
Country Tax wedge Income tax Social security contribution rates Labour costs2 
      employee employer   
Belgium 55,4 21,4 10,7 23,3 53 581
Germany 51,8 17,3 17,3 17,3 53 278
United Kingdom 33,5 15,7 8,2 9,6 50 982
France 50,1 10,8 9,6 29,7 47 824
Austria 47,4 10,9 14,0 22,6 47 692
Netherlands 38,6 9,5 19,7 9,5 45 910
Sweden 47,9 18,1 5,3 24,5 43 916
Finland 44,6 20,1 5,1 19,4 43 443
Denmark 41,4 30,2 10,6 0,5 38 664
EU-15 42,1 14,2 10,0 17,8 36 205
Italy 45,4 13,6 6,9 24,9 36 011
Spain 39,0 10,7 4,9 23,4 34 545
Ireland 25,7 11,4 4,7 9,7 34 395
USA 29,1 14,6 7,3 7,3 34 144
Greece 38,8 4,3 12,5 21,9 33 050
Portugal 36,2 8,1 8,9 19,2 24 933
Czech Republic 43,8 8,6 9,3 25,9 20 559
Poland 43,6 5,3 21,3 17,0 19 548
Hungary 50,5 14,3 10,0 26,3 18 559
Slovakia 38,3 6,9 10,6 20,8 15 748
Note: 1 Single individual without children at the income level of average worker. 
2
  US dollars with equal purchasing power. 
Source: OECD 
If we look at V-4 countries we can see, except Hungary, minimal differences between two 
observed groups. If we look more precisely we find out some differences between countries – 
e.g. Czech Republic applied high level of employer ´s social contribution rates, but in Poland 
employees paid more than employer. Hungary applied high tax progressiveness in contrast to 
other V-4 countries. 
 
5. Active labour market policies 
According to Scarpetta [21] active labour market policies (ALMPs) encompass different 
measures, including training and re-training programmes, job-search counselling, job-
brokerage services and different forms of subsidised employment.  
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The main aim of ALMPs is to improve the possibilities of unemployed to re-enter labour 
market. These policies are well founded in case of low income and low skilled labour force. 
ALMPs may have several effects on employment and Estevao [12] alludes to at least five 
channels: 
- ALMPs may generate more efficient matching between job vacancies and unemployed 
workers because of adjustments in job-seekers’ skills (for instance, through training 
programs) or more effective searching (for instance, through more active employment 
agencies); 
- labour force productivity may increase, owing to either training programs or on-the-job 
learning, in the case of direct subsidies to job creation; 
- ALMPs may keep unemployed workers attached to the labour force, even after a longer 
period of inactivity; 
- job creation programs (e.g., direct subsidies to low-skill employment) may generate 
windfall effects; 
- ALMPs may lower the disutility of being unemployed, as they provide an occupation to 
otherwise unemployed workers, some income, and a hope of keeping their labour skills. 
 
Table 3 shows the composition of expenditure on LMP measures by category for 2004. 
The largest share of expenditure among selected EU countries felt on measures providing 
training. The second most important category was employment incentives. These measures 
support the recruitment of unemployed people into regular market jobs, typically through 
wage-subsidies or exemptions to employers social contributions. If we look at the table we 
can see significant share of expenditure differences among EU countries even among V-4 
countries7. In Czech Republic and Hungary employment incentives represented the most 
important area of expenditure in 2004, whereas in Slovakia the most imporant area was direct 
job creation.  The specific situation was in United Kingdom, where training was much used 
and consumed 82,6% of ALMPs expenditure. Another imporant area of ALMPs was 
integration of disabled and this categore represented the largest share of expenditure in 
Scandinavian countries (Denmark and Sweden) and Netherlands.  Start-up incentives, which 
aim is to promote enterpreneurship by encouraging the unemployed and other target groups to 
start their own business or to become self-employed are relatively not important and they 
consumed small share of ALMPs expenditure (except Slovakia and Greece).   
Table 3. Share of expenditure on ALMPs measures by category, 2004 
                                                 
7
 Data from Poland were not available.  
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  Training Employment 
incentives  
Integration 
of disabled 
Direct job 
creation 
Start-up 
incentives  
Belgium 21,3 16,5 11,8 50,0 0,4 
Czech Rep. 12,8 35,7 25,0 22,7 3,8 
Denmark 35,5 30,3 34,2 0,0 - 
Germany 42,5 9,9 17,2 15,1 15,3 
Spain 22,2 42,7 12,8 14,7 6,1 
France 42,5 13,6 11,7 31,7 0,5 
Ireland 36,8 14,6 7,1 41,5 - 
Italy 41,4 45,5 1,2 1,8 9,6 
Hungary 22,3 45,7 4,5 24,9 2,7 
Netherlands 31,8 2,6 49,7 15,9 - 
Austria 64,8 12,9 11,9 9,5 0,9 
Portugal 52,8 31,0 8,3 7,4 0,5 
Slovakia 14,1 10,9 1,2 48,7 25,0 
Finland 51,9 15,9 12,8 10,9 1,9 
Sweden 34,6 18,5 43,0 - 3,3 
United 
Kingdom 
82,6 1,0 13,6 2,5 0,3 
Greece 18,5 25,3 19,6 - 36,5 
 Source: Melis [18] 
6. Unemployment benefits 
System of unemployment benefits and employment protection legislation are two way how 
to protect workers in case of loss of employment. While EPL protects labour force which is 
employed and do not invoke any tax burden explicitly, unemployment benefits provide 
insurance to better part of labour force and UB are financed by social security contributions.  
Grubb [15] makes reference to most national labour legislations on providing these 
benefits are strict in one aspect – after certain duration of providing unemployment benefits 
the unemployed workers are obliged to accept whatsoever job regardless of qualification.   
Some authors argue that „the longer unemployment benefits are available the longer 
unemployment lasts“. 8 Higher level of unemployment benefits and longer period of providing 
reduce the gap between income from working activity and transfers which means that the 
initiative to work is lower. According to Jackman, Layard and Nickell [16] unemployment 
benefits operate through dual mechanism: i) they reduce fear of being unemployed and ii) 
they restrain the effectiveness of filling new jobs by unemployed and subsequently employers 
are hustled to wage increase.   
Negative effects of generous system of unemployment benefits can be offset by active 
labour market policies (if their providing is time-limited and the rules for qualifying exist – 
e.g. mandatory re-skilling).   
                                                 
8
 Jackman, Layard and Nickell [16, p.1] 
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International comparison of this institutional aspect is also complicated because only one 
level of replacement rate does not exit in any state. Individual unemployment benefits systems 
in member states of EU take into account number of specific personal and family 
circumstances of unemployed, previous job history. Hence EU member states apply different 
system of unemployment and social insurance. In some countries unemployment benefit are 
taxable.  
OECD in order to compare unemployment benefits systems creates an indicator called 
replacement rate. This indicator gives the relation between income during employment and 
income during period of unemployment. We can count this indicator as a ratio which means 
that the closer the values are the less difference between wage and unemployment benefit is. 
We distinction between i) gross replacement rate, which is pre-tax ratio of wage and 
unemployment benefits and ii) net replacement rate, which is after-tax ratio of wage and 
unemployment benefits.  
If the net replacement rate does not much differ from income from employment than we 
talk about unemployment trap. 
 
 
Table 4. Main indicators of system of unemployment benefits (2004) 
 
Unemployment 
insurance benefit 
duration (months, 
equivalent initial rate) 
Initial net replacement rate  
(as % of net earnings in 
work) 
Average of net 
replacement rates  over 
60 months of 
unemployment (as % of 
net earnings in work) 
Social expenditures on 
unemployed (as % of total 
social protection 
expenditures) 
Belgium No limit 61 61 12,4 
Austria 9 63 57 6,0 
Denmark 48 70 70 9,8 
Finland 23 70 65 9,9 
France 23 75 57 7,9 
Germany 12 69 66 8,6 
Ireland 15 49 64 8,4 
Italy 6 54 22 1,8 
Netherlands 24 74 66 6,2 
Greece 12 55 35 5,7 
Portugal 24 83 68 5,5 
Spain 21 67 49 13,3 
Sweden 28 75 63 5,9 
United Kingdom 6 54 53 2,7 
Czech Republic 5 56 53 3,9 
Hungary 9 49 39 2,8 
Poland 12 59 54 4,0 
Slovakia 8 56 40 5,8 
Source: OECD [19] 
If we follow OECD recommendations we can discover some implications. As far back as 
in 1994 OECD Job Strategy reflected some conclusions of economic theory – generous 
unemployment benefits, which are provided for a long time, have negative impacts on labour 
market performance. On the other side Job Strategy did not impeach the needfulness of 
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financial stability in period of job search. This is very difficult to reach if the unemployed 
person does not have government ´s financial support. That why OECD did not recommend 
any measures to achieve optimum length of providing of unemployment benefits. We can find 
out some recommendation about the generosity of the system – in terms of its reduction. 
Second finding is that OECD recommended to re-value the condition of qualifying for 
providing unemployment benefits. This step is associated with assuring of active job search 
during being unemployed.     
Denmark and Belgium are distinguished by a long period of unemployment insurance 
benefit duration (in Belgium exists unlimited duration). In addition, not only the initial 
replacement rate was relatively high but also replacement rate over 60 months of 
unemployment and social expenditures on unemployed were relatively high. Italy and Greece 
form opposite approach – short period of unemployment insurance benefit duration, 
significant lower replacement rate over 60 months of unemployment or social expenditures on 
unemployed.  
V-4 countries have similar approach – period of unemployment insurance benefit duration 
was short compared with EU-15 average value, social expenditures on unemployed were half 
compared with EU-15 average value and both initial and over 60 months of unemployment 
replacement rates were lower compared with average. 
Group of countries (Austria, United Kingdom and Germany) had similar data as V-4 
countries. Scandinavian countries (Finland, Sweden and Denmark) had initial replacement 
rate which did not much differ from replacement rate over 60 months of unemployment. Their 
social expenditures on unemployed were close to 10 % of total social expenditures.      
 
7. Comparison overall labour market flexibility 
Before our own labour market flexibility analysis I submit some conclusions, which are 
taken from [19].  First, I discuss data which are contained in Table 5. The table was set up by 
simple statistics methods in order to identify empirical patterns between different conceptions 
of an institutional framework of labour market.  
Whether we look at right part of left part of the table, it stands to reason that achievement 
of the same labour market performance is possible by different conceptions of labour market 
policy. It is also a question, if we can implicitly determine general framework of economic-
political recommendations for optimal labour market performance. I argue that it is good to 
follow recommendations made by OECD. Therefore it is necessary to implement other 
measures which should take into account different cultural and historical progress and, of 
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course, current setting of the institutional framework of labour market (e.g. lowering tax 
wedge should be accompanied with parallel reform of social and health system with a view of 
keeping a balance between government revenues and expenditures). In other words, it is not 
maintainable, in long run view, to use Anglo-Saxon system of taxation of labour and parallel 
exercitation of Scandinavian unemployment benefits. 
 Table 5. Four different regimes of labour market function 
    
High employment outcome 
and institutional aspects  
Low employment outcome and 
institutional aspects 
  
OECD 
unweighted 
average 
Anglo-Saxon 
countries a 
Scandinavian 
countries b 
Countries of 
continental and 
southern Europe c 
Countries 
Visegrád 4 d 
Employment 
protection legislation 2,01 1,38 2,13 2,71 1,83 
Generosity of 
unemployment 
benefit system e 27,81 18,23 39,86 36,17 9,69 
Active labour market 
programmes f 29,25 15,76 64,14 25,84 3,46 
Tax wedge g 27,1 18,54 27,42 34,33 32,43 
Union coverage 59,96 30,75 83,33 82,57 38,33 
Union coordination 2,88 1,88 3,92 3,79 1,33 
Employment rate 67,11 70,92 71,92 62,54 58,00 
Unemployment rate 7,47 5,3 4,79 8,97 15,12 
Note:  
a) This group of countries includes Australia, Canada, Japan, Korea, New Zealand, Switzerland, the United 
Kingdom and the United States. 
b) This group of countries includes Austria, Denmark, Ireland, the Netherlands, Norway and Sweden. 
c) This group of countries includes Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Portugal and Spain. 
d) This group of countries includes the Czech Republic, Poland and the Slovak Republic. 
e) Average unemployment benefit replacement rate across two income situations (100% and 67% of APW 
earnings), three family situations (single, with dependent spouse, with spouse in work), over a five-year period of 
unemployment. 
f) ALMP expenditures per unemployed workers as a percentage of GDP per capita. 
g) Tax wedge between the labour cost to the employer and the corresponding net take-home pay of the employee 
for a couple with a dependent spouse and two children earning 100% of APW earnings. 
Source: OECD [19] 
Another significant finding in [19] is heterogeneity in economy policy setting and relation 
to overall labour market performance within OECD countries. This analysis provides 
following considerations: 
- positive labour market indicators development (employment and unemployment rate) 
could be associated with different levels of interventionism.  
- it depends on a mix between supply and demand side economic policy.    
If we look at analysed data from previous parts of the paper, these concluding remarks 
occur: 
- Most V-4 countries had slightly higher tax wedge compared to EU-15. 
- V-4 countries had lower legislation regulation than EU-15 average; 
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- Coefficients of union density and union coverage of V-4 countries were close to valuable 
of 1 (except Poland) which means that bargaining power is corresponding to union 
membership.  
- Wage bargaining coordination was among V-4 countries significant lower. This is given 
in that wage bargaining takes place on firm level. 
- Duration of providing unemployment replacement rates was shorter in V-4 countries than 
EU-15. 
- Labour markets in V-4 countries appeared to be more flexible than in EU-14 but level of 
flexibility is much lower compared to the USA. 
As part of the ongoing reassessment of its recommendations to address issues of high 
unemployment and low labour-force participation, the OECD in study [6] has carried out a 
thorough assessment of labour market reforms on which this section relies heavily. All policy 
measures implemented ALMPs, taxes and social security contributions, EPL, unemployment 
benefit systems, wage formation and industrial relations, working-time flexibility and part-
time work and old-age pension systems and early retirement schemes. 
 
Table 6. Aggregate reform intensity indicator, reform intensity indicator by area (1994-2004)
  
 
Summary reform 
intensity indicator1 Reform intensity indicator by area1 
 Score Ranking2 ALMPs Tax wedge EPL 
Unemployment 
benefits 
Wage 
formation 
Working 
time 
flexibility 
Early 
retirement, 
invalidity 
and old-
age 
pension 
system 
Czech 
Republic 6,2 28 17 0 
-3 12 -5 -17 33 
Hungary 12,3 19 31 25 -7 19 -9 0 33 
Poland 11,2 23 29 0 -3 15 5 17 0 
Slovakia 13,0 18 12 25 14 19 0 17 8 
Note: 1 all reform intensity indicators are expressed as a percentage of the maximum possible score 
2 Ranking within 30 OECD countries 
Source: Brandt, Burniaux and Duval [6]. 
 
Table 6 represents the reform intensity indicators. According to Brandt, Burniaux and 
Duval [6] there is no clear relationship between the initial conditions of labour market 
performance and subsequent reform efforts. Some countries have taken only modest action 
despite a poor starting point (Poland, Slovakia and Hungary) compared with the rest of OECD 
countries.  Only few reforms have been reported for the Czech Republic (mainly because of 
favourable initial labour market performance compared with the rest of V-4 countries during 
90´s).  
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Conclusions 
This paper deals with labour market perfomance in V-4 countries. If the autonomous 
monetary policy is no more available, economic theory defined the labour market flexibility 
as an instrument for adjustment process in case of asymmetric shock. Another need of the 
labour market flexibility is resulting from maintenance or increase of competitive strength.  
On the assumption that Eurozone states, which had mostly lower overall labour market 
flexibility then V-4 countries, then I suppose that accession of Czech Republic or other EU 
new Member states will not mean increased costs for present Eurozone states. It is true, that 
Eurozone has not been hit by significant asymmetric shocks which would prove theoretical 
literature conclusions yet. Though I am in essential agreement with argumentation that labour 
market reforms are unavoidable. This holds especially for countries of continental Europe or 
south Europe. If we look at situation in V-4 countries I assume that the need for labour market 
reform arise not either from future adopting single currency but from demographic situation 
and structure of social and pension system. In these boundaries future accession into 
Eurozone may subserve as an exogenous anchor (we can see similarity in accession of the 
Czech Republic into EU, which also subserved as an exogenous anchor during complicated 
transition process). Then the lowering of labour taxation, the reform of pension system and 
the long-term unemployment are the main tasks for political authorities. Some of these 
reforms have been already taken in the Czech Republic but we can thin of these reforms as 
partial ones (in the Slovak Republic these reforms were much more intensive). 
Claims on increased labour market flexibility arise with probable scenario of inconsistent 
business cycle of V-4 countries and the rest of Eurozone. If we look at economic forecast then 
higher annual growths are predicted in case of V-4 countries in comparison with Eurozone 
ones. Then ECB will have tied hands because it will have only one monetary instrument for 
adjustment process in two different stage of business cycle. Finally, I stress need of sufficient 
labour market flexibility for adjustment process again.  
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